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Introduction
The topic of elites has always been controversial in Latin American
social sciences. Elites have been studied indirectly as landowners, cap-
italists, business-leaders or politicians, and have also been approached
directly using concepts and theory from elite studies. Although there
is a signiﬁcant amount of literature on the role of elites in democratic
transformations (see e.g. Higley and Gunther, 1992), elites have often
been considered to be an obstacle to the formation of more demo-
cratic, prosperous and egalitarian societies (e.g. Paige, 1997; Cimoli
and Rovira, 2008). This is also the case in the literature on envi-
ronmental governance, in which elite groups are often considered to
be an obstacle to sustainable development and an obstacle to estab-
lishing more equitable inﬂuence over the use and beneﬁts of natural
resources. Therefore, although an elitist conservation movement has
long existed in Latin America, struggles to protect the environment
from overexploitation and contamination have commonly been related
to struggles against local, national and transnational elites by subaltern
groups (Martínez-Alier, 2002; Carruthers, 2008; chapters 1 and 2 in this
volume).
Over the last decade a number of changes, which might have an
impact on the composition and attitudes of elites, have occurred in
Latin America. Such changes could have consequences for environ-
mental governance in the broad sense of the concept, as outlined in
the Introduction of this book. Out of 49 presidential elections in the
2003–2013 period, 22 were won by centre-left candidates, and with
the exception of Mexico and Colombia, centre-left governments were
in power in all the large economies in Latin America for most of this
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period (Bull, 2014). Many of these governments represent groups that
have previously been marginalized from politics and antagonized by the
elites, including indigenous and environmental movements. With the
changes in the global political economy, including the rise of China and
a number of other emerging economies, Latin America has also seen the
entry of a number of new economic actors, including new transnational
companies and new lenders. Furthermore, in key sectors, new tech-
nologies have changed the production structure and therefore also the
concentration of resources – and, in turn, possibly the composition of
elites.
In spite of several such changes, the initial optimism regarding
implications for environmental governance has subsided. In 2010,
environmentalist Eduardo Gudynas (2010) rhetorically asked the new
governments: If you are so progressive, why do you destroy the environ-
ment? In the aftermath, several other questions have been posed about
why governments that publicly rejected genetically modiﬁed agriculture
later promoted it; why they accelerated the issuing of mining conces-
sions in spite of protests from their former constituencies; and why they
expanded logging and oil exploitation in vulnerable areas in spite of
pledging to protect them.
The aim of this chapter is to provide new insight into the elite dynam-
ics that may provide answers to some of the questions outlined above.
The chapter empirically interrogates elite shifts based on six case studies,
outlining how new elites have emerged, how old elites have contin-
ued to inﬂuence politics and the economy, and how the relationship
between new and old elites has affected environmental governance in
the region.
For our analysis we use a “resource-based” deﬁnition of elites in
environmental governance: “Groups of individuals that due to their eco-
nomic resources, expertise/knowledge, social networks, or positions in
political or other organizations stand in a privileged position to inﬂu-
ence in a formal or informal way decisions and practices with key social
and environmental implications” (Bull, 2015: 18). This is a multifaceted
deﬁnition of elites that allows for the existence of both parallel and
competing elites. Nevertheless, our analysis places particular emphasis
on elites that control economic resources, including business elites and
landowners. Therefore below we discuss the relationship between the
concept of elite and that of class, and we discuss how elites and classes
are considered to contribute to or hinder democracy and development,
how they might change, and how they might be thought to impact
environmental governance.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The second part
presents the puzzles motivating our study. In most cases these refer
to environmental practices or environmental policies that were less
sustainable than what was expected. Yet there are also cases in which
surprising progress has been made. The third part summarizes the
different problems of elites as discussed in the literature. The discus-
sion includes the structural limitations to the transformative poten-
tials related to a shift in the command of liberal political institu-
tions, the predominance of “elite circulation”, and what we call the
“state/development” imperative based on a Weberian understanding
of the need for state construction. The fourth part discusses different
ways in which our case studies illustrate and conﬁrm the problems
discussed in the elite literature: how entrenched elites have hindered
structural transformations towards an environmental governance that
ensures more sustainable and equitable production; the conﬂicts over
land use and how they have their roots in institutions that are kept weak
due to historical control by elites; and how new governments accom-
modate their politics to the demands of the elites. However, some of the
ﬁndings also challenge the rather pessimistic outlook of elite theory. In
the ﬁfth part we concentrate on the role of global economic transitions
and technology, and elite shifts. The sixth part discusses the possibilities
for change due to the emergence of new elites with different attitudes
towards environmental governance. These include both new political
elites and new knowledge elites. Finally, the conclusions are presented.
The puzzles: Progress and setback in environmental
governance under leftist governments
In 2009, when El Salvador got its ﬁrst president supported by a leftwing
and former guerrilla party (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación
Nacional (FMLN)), it was a major break with the past. Before Mauricio
Funes’ electoral victory, El Salvador had been ruled for 20 years by the
same business elite-led party (Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA)).
During this period the country had undergone a major economic
transformation from an agroexport country to one dependent on remit-
tances and the service sector (Segovia, 2002). This conversion brought
temporary relief to the environmental impact of agroexport-oriented
agricultural production, of which the most damaging products were
cotton and sugar (Hecht et al., 2006). Nevertheless, when Funes took
power, the country faced a triple crisis – economic, social and environ-
mental – which enhanced the vulnerability of the population to natural
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catastrophes. Yet the country was also characterized by signiﬁcant rural
as well as urban political mobilization, and by the existence of various
organizations that had developed sophisticated alternatives to the con-
ventional agricultural development model. In spite of this, the Funes
government struggled hard to set El Salvador on a different path, and,
in the end, new ideas related to alternative agricultural development
became marginalized in the national agenda, while there was no con-
sensus on why no new development model was allowed to emerge while
the old one continued to perform badly.
In Bolivia, Evo Morales – who came to power in 2006 with his Proceso
de Cambio (process of change) – gave priority to family and small-scale
agriculture over industrialized agriculture. This also implied a rejection
of all GM organisms due to their environmental and health implica-
tions. This position echoed the viewpoints of a broad array of social
movements upon which the governing party, MAS, was based. Since
coming into power, MAS has been in deep conﬂicts with the country’s
old elite, with their stronghold in the “half-moon” states (Santa Cruz,
Beni, Pando y Tarija) and controlling most of the country’s economic
sectors, including agriculture. Paradoxically, during the government of
Evo Morales, the amount of genetically produced soy in Bolivia more
than doubled (Zeballos, 2012), and the question of how the government
could make this compatible with the ofﬁcial anti-GM discourse became
more and more pressing.
Argentina has also been marked by deep conﬂicts between the gov-
ernments of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of
the Peronist party (Partido Justicialista) and agricultural elites. Yet, at
the same time, Argentina has become one of the major producers of
genetically modiﬁed soy in the world, with major implications for the
structure of the agricultural sector as well as for the environment (Trigo,
2011). Why was there so little public debate about it?
In Ecuador a major puzzle regarding biotechnology also arose. A major
shift in the governance of the country occurred when Rafael Correa
came to power, leading a broad coalition (Alianza PAIS) with strong par-
ticipation from both indigenous and environmental movements. The
platform for the coalition strongly rejected GM organisms and other
uses of biotechnology in agriculture. However, once in government,
Correa strongly promoted their use.
The mining sector is probably the most controversial in Latin America
today, with its notable expansion, and its obvious environmental and
social impacts, along with the large number of conﬂicts mining has
generated across the region (see also chapters 2 and 11). In Guatemala,
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in the silver mining project El Escobal in the south-eastern part of the
country, a transnational company (Tahoe Resources Inc.) and national
elites face the protests of the indigenous Xinka people and their organi-
zations. However, in spite of stated good intentions by the government
as well as the companies, repressive practices against the protesters
have continued and there has been virtually no room for dialogue. We
attempt to explain why it has proved so difﬁcult to mediate between the
conﬂicting parties.
However, there are also positive cases. In the Brazilian states of Acre
and Amazonas, there have been signiﬁcant improvements in forest pol-
icy and forest protection over recent years. This stands in stark contrast
with the rather disappointing record regarding forest protection of the
federal government during the three consecutive governments led by
the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)), those of the Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2007 and 2007–2011) and Dilma Rousseff
(2011–2014) administrations. Moreover, advances in forest governance
have occurred in states governed by different parties. What can explain
Acre and Amazona’s success?
Environmental policies and practices are not only inﬂuenced by
domestic and local politics. There are also questions to be asked of inter-
national initiatives. One of the international initiatives with the most
far-reaching consequences for forest governance in Latin America at the
moment is the project known as Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD). In spite of its rhetoric of inclusion,
not all involved parties seem to have found their views expressed in
the initiative. Instead, REDD is generating its own “elite” and its own
discourse, and the question is how this can really address the pressing
issues in Latin America’s environmental governance.
Our approach to answering these questions has been to focus on elites.
Thus in the following section we will discuss what elite theory might say
about the questions above.
The “elite problem” in theories of development, democracy
and environmental governance
The recent increase in interest about elites and development in aca-
demic literature is closely connected to an increasing consensus about
the importance of institutions for development, and the role of elites
in shaping those institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Amsden,
Di Caprio and Robinson, 2012). A focus on elites and institutions is
in no way new in development theory. It has been a central element
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in Weberian-inspired development theory, from Gunnar Myrdal to the
literature on the “developmental state”1 (Myrdal, 1968; Woo-Cumings,
1999). Elites have sometimes been considered a hindrance to the emer-
gence of such a state. As argued by Myrdal, “In fact, [elites] are best
deﬁned as people who are in a position to hinder reforms or to manipu-
late them, and, in the end, to obstruct their implementation” (Myrdal,
2010 [1979]: 335). However, others have considered elites to be capable
of the efﬁcient and productive channelling of resources, although they
have frequently also acted as rent-seekers and have directed resources
towards favoured and inefﬁcient social groups (Amsden, Di Caprio and
Robinson, 2012: 5).
Much less discussed is the relationship between elites, institutions
and sustainable development, a dynamic that also necessitates the anal-
ysis of environmental governance. The literature referred to above is
almost exclusively focused on economic growth and industrial upgrad-
ing. Furthermore, the term “institutions” is largely equated with “state
institutions”, and “development” is understood as economic growth at
the national level. This literature has, to a very limited degree, prob-
lematized the environmental sustainability of development, and its
distributional implications are only considered to the extent that they
have consequences for long-term national economic growth. In other
words, distribution of the beneﬁts of growth and development across
social groups and geographical areas is only considered a problem if it
leads to decelerated growth – for example, if the majority are too poor
to constitute a market or lack the health and education to provide the
necessary human resources.
This view of development is often rejected by the literature on polit-
ical ecology that takes “Capitalism and its historical transformations
[as] a starting point for any account of the destruction of nature”
(Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2010: 23). What was characterized above as
“development” is, in political ecology literature, considered to be the
privileging of certain exploitative productive systems over others, caus-
ing intertwined distributive and ecological conﬂicts and the degradation
of the environment (Alimonda, 2011). In the political ecology literature,
however, elites are largely “black boxed”. Elites appear as the perpetra-
tors: they are the capital owners, the business and knowledge elites, and
the groups controlling the state, thereby contributing to the marginal-
ization of people inhabiting rural landscapes and to the overexploitation
and pollution of natural resources (Carruthers, 2008). However, elites in
the political ecology literature are rarely the object of direct scrutiny.
Their interests are considered to be dependent on their location in the
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structural relations of domination, and their privileges to be derived
from their positions in the structures that conﬁgure Latin America as a
subaltern region open to exploitation according to the needs of a glob-
ally integrated capitalism. The double exploitation of people and nature
also forms the basis of the construction of the modern states, dominated
by national elites, but it is also often based on the control of natural
resources and local groups in different parts of the territory (Alimonda,
2011).
Against the backdrop presented above, we should not only ask under
what conditions we can expect elite objectives to be aligned with
national development goals. We also have to discuss how to make those
goals aligned with the interests, needs and aspirations of all popula-
tion groups across social classes and territories, as well as with those of
future generations. A common answer to the question of how to achieve
that has been to emphasize pluralism and democracy; in other words, to
ensure that there are good mechanisms of representation, participation
and accountability, which can lead to the establishment of institutions
of environmental governance with the potential of less elitist and more
sustainable development outcomes. This has been what many hoped
would occur in Latin America in recent decades after the return to formal
democracies and the historical rise of previously marginalized groups to
power in the government.
Elite theory has nevertheless never been convinced of the merits of
pluralist democracies to make societies more egalitarian. To the contrary,
elite theories of all kinds have had a quite dismal view of the potential
of democracy to transform society, a matter that is partially rooted in
their view of the state. Marxist elite theory, which deﬁnes elites based
on their relationship to capital and means of production, is generally
sceptical of the possibility for changes in the state without underly-
ing changes in the mode of production upholding it (see e.g. Jessop,
1990). As a democratic government depends on public support, it will
suffer if it presides over a serious drop in the level of economic activity
as a result of conﬂicts with capitalists (Block, 1977). Therefore, in spite
of the establishment of pluralist institutions, the state cannot really be
democratized within a capitalist economy.
The other major classical political-economy theory of elites and
democracy, developed by Schumpeter, was highly critical of the Marxist
equation of true democracy with socialism, although not discharging
the possibility that they could coexist.2 He does not have much more
faith in pluralism either. Schumpeter’s main point is that democracy
is inherently elitist: “democracy does not mean and cannot mean that
144 Changing Elites and Institutions
the people actually rule . . .Democracy means only that the people have
the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men (sic) who are to rule
them” (Schumpeter, 1976: 285). However, this should not lead one to
be pessimistic about the decisions made in democratic institutions. The
functioning of democracy would depend on the degree to which a gov-
ernment is restrained by autonomous state powers (most importantly,
the judiciary), the self-restraint used by such powers (also parliamentary)
and the existence of an independent bureaucracy.
The so-called “Italian school” of elite theory was also sceptical of the
virtues of pluralist democracies. Originating in the writings of Mosca,
Mitchells and Pareto (see Pareto 1997 [1935]; Mosca, 1939; Michels,
1962), it deﬁnes the elite as a distinct group of society that enjoys a
privileged status and exercises decisive control over the organization of
society (Wolf, 2012: 120). Mosca regarded universal suffrage and par-
liamentarism as unable to dissolve the principle that, in any society, an
“organized minority” is able to “impose its will on a disorganized major-
ity” (Mosca, 1939: 154), while Vilfredo Pareto argued that elites would
slowly be replaced by ascending families and groups without changing
the elitist structures of society (Pareto, 1935). Yet it is this elite circula-
tion, not the revolutions led by the dispossessed classes, that would lead
to change (Pareto, 1916, cited in Hartmann, 2007).
For this study we adopted a “resource-based deﬁnition” as outlined
above, which combines some of the elements of the Italian approach
with that of the Marxist approach. The deﬁnition we adopted here con-
siders elites to potentially emerge from their control of various and
possibly overlapping resources, including organizational (control over
organizations, including the state), political (public support), symbolic
(knowledge and ability to manipulate symbols and discourses) and per-
sonal (such as charisma, time, motivation and energy) (Etzioni-Halevy,
1997: xxv). Yet we also include a focus on the actual inﬂuence that these
groups have on the environmental outcomes of changing policies and
practices.
Also, our view on how elites shift is eclectic. In the Marxist view,
rather than through a democratic shift of government, change would
emanate from below, based on the construction of political subjects
among the dispossessed classes. However, Marxism has also envisioned
changes emerging from the space opened for the “relative autonomy of
the state” in situations of weak or split class forces (Jessop, 1990). The
capitalist classes were considered to be unable to establish a “political
hegemony” by themselves, thus ensuring the dominance of the lower
classes. This is rather the role of the state, which in the process assumes
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a relative autonomy from the capitalist classes (Poulantzas, 1978). This
makes room for the emergence of a state elite that is functionally set
apart from the capitalist class.
This is an issue that is also essential to Weber, who regards the state
bureaucracy not only as a by-product of capitalism but as the most effec-
tive form of legitimate power and the source of the emergence of an
entirely new class (Weber, 1978). The structure and power of the bureau-
cracy is much more important than the electoral institutions since the
demos itself is “a shapeless mass [that] never ‘governs’ larger associa-
tions, but rather is governed” (Weber, 1978). The dilemma presented to
new political forces gaining formal power over a state apparatus is that,
while the bureaucracy may hinder a shift in policies and practices, it may
take decades to construct. Irrespective of how much popular support a
ruler may enjoy, without the instrument of a modern bureaucracy, his
or her ability to enact, implement and enforce his or her will is severely
limited.
In sum, with the exception of the Marxists, elite theorists doubt the
possibility of elite-free societies. Moreover, they all have reservations
against the belief that a shift in government will automatically result in
a shift in elites. Nevertheless, there are venues open for change. We focus
on shifts in the elites’ control of resources that result in changes in their
ability to exert inﬂuence over decisions and practices with environmen-
tal implications. In Latin America recently, we identiﬁed four such shifts,
which will be discussed below.
Leftwing governments, elite circulation and limitations
to environmental governance shifts
The ﬁrst such process of change is the shift in control of political
resources related to the entering of power of centre-left governments,
many of which represented groups that had previously been excluded
from political power, including indigenous movements, labour move-
ments, environmental movements and diverse social movements con-
stituted by dispossessed groups. In spite of getting electoral support
from these groups, many of the governments have later disqualiﬁed or
consciously attempted to co-opt some of them (Zibechi, 2010; Bowen,
2011), while new elites emerge. Thus we may observe a process of “cir-
culation of the elites”, controlling political resources with a possible
impact on environmental governance.
One example of that is found in Bolivia, where groups associated with
the governing party MAS have started to gain political resources and
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power (Ayo Saucedo, 2012), but also economic resources through, for
example, the processes of nationalization of enterprises (Ayo Saucedo
et al., 2013). The soy sector has long been dominated by a landed elite,
with diverse origins (including large groups of immigrants from Brazil),
but with a common discourse on the use of GM, the beneﬁts of indus-
trial agriculture and the desire to be independent from the Morales
government (Plata, 2008; Soruco, 2008). This traditional elite still con-
trol important economic resources (particularly through their control
of land). Nevertheless, a new group of people, with signiﬁcantly fewer
economic resources than the traditional economic and political elite,
has entered the political arena and is exerting inﬂuence over the way in
which the environmental consequences of GM agricultural production
are addressed (Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015). This new group is com-
posed of soy farmers who have accessed their productive capacity due to
contacts in the MAS party, and political groups. While standing quite far
apart from the old soy elite on several matters of economic policy and so
forth, they coincide with them on the issue of the desirability of expan-
sion of GM soy. Soy production contributes substantially to government
revenues and perhaps, therefore, the expansion of GM soy production
into forested areas is not rejected by the government.
In El Salvador, the entering of a centre-left government had quite
different consequences. El Salvador is a country that has historically
been dominated by a closely knit agroexport-based elite that have had
political power for most of the country’s history, historically in con-
junction with the military (Paige, 1997). Between 1989 and 2009 they
ruled through the rightwing ARENA party, led by some of the coun-
try’s richest families. Thus they awaited the coming of a government
supported by the FMLN with signiﬁcant fear and contempt, and the
old elite put up both political and economic resistance. However, the
right wing was already split when the Funes government came into
power, partially due to the prior transformation of El Salvador from an
agroexport- to a service-based economy dependent on remittances from
migrants in the USA. Although the old elite families diversiﬁed their
portfolios to beneﬁt from the new economy (Bull, 2013), the economic
transformation also produced the ascendance of new economic elites
that eventually challenged the old elite dominating the ARENA party.
That resulted in the breakout of the GANA party (Gran Alianza por la
Unidad Nacional) soon after the Funes government took power. The
Funes government attempted to include broad groups of the society in a
multistakeholder dialogue to establish new forms of governance of agri-
cultural and other productive activities. The purpose was to confront
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the grave environmental crisis in which El Salvador was submerged. The
groups that advocated a different agricultural model more focused on
small farms and ecological production included both members of the
new government, particularly linked to the Ministry of the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (MARN), and a broad set of civil society
organizations working locally to create economies based on principles
of ecology and solidarity.
However, the government could not ignore the economic crisis, with
low or negative growth for many consecutive years. As predicted by
Block and other Marxists, the government’s dependence on the eco-
nomic elites for investment limited strongly its freedom of action.
The domestic economic elite also represented the political opposi-
tion, although it was split between ARENA and GANA. Although
ARENA, GANA and the private sector peak association ANEP (Asociación
Nacional de la Empresa Privada) initially participated in different forums
of dialogue to reach solutions to pressing problems (including the Social
and Economic Council established on the model of a similar institution
in the EU), the relationship soon soured. The government was required
to re-establish a relationship with the private sector in the context of the
US-funded Alliance for Growth program, but then chose to deal directly
with a narrow group of the country’s most powerful businessmen in
order to attempt to entice them to invest in El Salvador. In the process,
however, the development plans became more and more aligned with
the business elite’s priorities and less and less to the groups proposing
alternative models within the government (Bull, Cuéllar and Kandel,
2014). There was also an incipient economic elite emerging as a result
of the policies of the new government. This had links to the govern-
ing party, but beneﬁted from its role in the companies established with
funds from the Venezuela-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA) (Lemus, 2014). However, this elite showed little inclina-
tion to support the groups within a ruling party that advocated a shift
towards a more sustainable development model.
The case of Ecuador is illustrative of a different solution to similar
structural constraints. When Rafael Correa came to power in 2008, it
was as head of a broad coalition with support from grassroots orga-
nizations, and with a strong environmentalist faction within the gov-
ernment. While new groups entered the governmental corridors, these
were not considered to be a new elite but rather a counterweight to
the traditional elites in Ecuador that had previously – and simultane-
ously – incorporated and marginalized grassroots organizations (Bowen,
2011). The environmentalists in the government were able to inﬂuence
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how environmental issues were framed in the ofﬁcial discourse, and
important changes in the status of the environment and its relation
to human activity were introduced to the constitution of the country
(Andrade, 2012; Basabe, Pachano and Acosta, 2012). One of the changes
made was that the government openly rejected GM organisms.
However, Correa’s government was equally challenged by old elites
that, although lacking a recent past of 20 years of relatively stable rule
that ARENA in El Salvador had enjoyed, were equally enmeshed in the
international economy (both countries converted to US dollars in 2000)
and had enjoyed strong privileges in association with multinational
companies in the past. Yet Correa managed to challenge the old elites to
a quite different extent than his El Salvadoran counterpart by ensuring
income from the oil industry, strengthening the incipient mining indus-
try and engaging in a process of strengthening the Ecuadorean state.
During Correa’s second term (2009–2013) his political project was
increasingly formulated as that of a developmentalist project, resting
on the parallel strengthening of technology and industrial upgrading
and the intensiﬁcation of resource extraction. This resulted in the weak-
ening of the environmentalist faction of the government and in the
emergence and gradual strengthening of a young technocratic elite.
This elite not only supported the industrialization efforts but also had
a positive view on GM organisms. These young professionals, owing
their inﬂuence to specialized knowledge of biotechnology, are becom-
ing key players in deﬁning strategies to achieve the diversiﬁcation of
agricultural production in Ecuador. Their view ﬁts well with the devel-
opmentalist ideas pursued by Correa, seeking rapid diversiﬁcation of the
Ecuadorian economy led by experts and guided by scientiﬁc knowledge
(SENPLADES, 2013). While these ideas made room for the inﬂuence of
this new technocratic elite, it is also the case that the emergence of the
technocratic elite reinforces and supports the plan.
Thus in the cases above we have seen the entry of new political
groups in government that have struggled against old elites in their pur-
suit of political and economic projects. However, in the process, new
elites have formed based on access to economic- and knowledge-based
resources in addition to political ones. Yet the elite circulation we have
seen in Ecuador and Bolivia has had a limited positive environmental
impact, as requirement for funding for social projects, the strengthen-
ing of the state, and the continued struggle against old elites have often
weighed stronger than environmental concerns. Moreover, emerging
new elites have had equally strong economic interests in the contin-
uation of an extractivist model, while political elites (particularly in the
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case of Ecuador) have sought support from groups controlling a tech-
nical knowledge and ideology of continued industrialization and the
conquering of nature.
The role of global economic transitions and technology
The second process of elite change is a shift in the control of economic
resources due to changes in the global economy. Parallel to the so-
called “left tide” in Latin America, three major interrelated trends have
occurred in the global economy: a rise in the demand and prices of com-
modities; the strongly related rise of China as a major economic power,
lender and investor in Latin America (Durán Lima and Pellandra, 2013);
and the strengthening of regional integration schemes such as ALBA,
MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which have favoured the emergence of new
economic elites associated with, for example, state-controlled or sup-
ported companies. These processes have enabled new groups to control
signiﬁcant shares of the economy.
The rise of China and booming commodity prices have allowed the
South American countries to speed up debt repayment to international
institutions, and to form new economic alliances. This has resulted
in a decrease in importance of elites that have traditionally been very
inﬂuential in the region, among them those related to Western multi-
national companies, the World Bank, the IDB and the International
Monetary Fund. As a result we are currently observing new relationships
and arrangements between national states on the one hand and, on
the other hand, diverse international elites of various origins, including
North American, European, Chinese and Latin American.
In all of the cases discussed here there has been, to a certain degree,
an interplay with commodity prices, particularly the booming of the
soy market and the opportunities that new elites have had to emerge.
One case in particular, Guatemala, suggests that when rising commod-
ity prices have resulted in the entrance of new transnational elites to
the country, the scope of possibilities to inﬂuence environmental gov-
ernance and outcomes of these new elites is limited not only by the
features of the industry (i.e. mining) but also by the dynamics found in
the relationship between new elites controlling access to markets and
technology, and old elites controlling political resources and land. New
transnational elites have opted to operate within a status quo deter-
mined by the power that the traditional elite holds over major knobs
of the economy and the government, and a series of corrupt practices
and relationships between the old, entrenched elite and the government
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(Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Guatemalan business elites have been success-
ful in keeping transnational elites, including transnational companies
from Canada, Australia, the USA and Russia, in a subordinate posi-
tion. This is explained by the control of different but complementary
resources. Domestic elites control important political resources, net-
works and information; transnational companies could not operate
without such resources (Schneider, 2012; Bull, Castellacci and Kasahara,
2014). Local elites have also established different types of partnership
with transnational mining companies. In many cases, local elites have
interests in junior mining ﬁrms that are subsidiaries of transnational
mining companies. The drafting of mining legislation in Guatemala
involved the participation of Canadian and Guatemalan businessmen,
and the resulting mining law disproportionately favours mining com-
panies over the interests of local populations, including their environ-
mental concerns (Dougherty, 2011). A mix of local and foreign capital
ﬁnances mining operations in Guatemala. Canadian groups in associa-
tion with Guatemalan capital dominate metallic mineral exploitation.
The largest non-metallic mining company is the Guatemalan company
Cementos Progreso, which makes the second largest contribution to
mining investments in Guatemala (Lee and Bonilla de Anzueto, 2009).
Mining contributed 2% to the GDP in 2013 but it is estimated that,
with the development of planned exploitation, mining could contribute
approximately 4% in the future (Lee and Bonilla de Anzueto, 2009). This
growth, however, is expected to occur in a context where 51% of the
population of the country (15 million) live in rural areas and rely on
agriculture for their livelihoods.
Mining operations have caused massive protests and discontent
among local populations in Guatemala. One of the main reasons is
that the law does not require companies to inform communities about
mining operations before applying for licences. In this context, local
communities have felt that their opinion has not been considered before
mining operations have started, something to which they are entitled by
law. Another source of discontent is that mining royalties were reduced
from 6% to 1% by a new mining bill (Decree 48–97) and this is per-
ceived among the general Guatemalan population as extremely unfair.
Another source of conﬂict is that mining projects are often established
in areas with longstanding conﬂicts related to access to land and land
tenure, before the conﬂicts have been resolved. In most cases the gov-
ernment has responded to the demands of participation from the local
population and to the protests with violence and repression. Also, as a
response to the complaints regarding royalties, the Chamber of Industry
unilaterally decided to propose a voluntary agreement by way of which
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mining royalties could, based solely on the decision of mining compa-
nies, be increased from 1% to 3% for gold and from 1% to 4% for silver,
whereas for other activities – such as cement production controlled by
a Guatemalan family – royalties were kept at 1%. The government is
then supposed to launch agreements with local authorities regarding
royalties in their communities. This has been strongly rejected by local
populations.
In Argentina there has been quite a different process of elite shift
dependent on a combination of technological shifts, a changing world
market and political changes. Soy production in the Pampa region in
Argentina started to expand after GM soy was legalized in 1996, but it
soon expanded in magnitude in other parts of the country as well, cur-
rently occupying approximately 22 million Ha, which is between 50%
and 60% of all the cultivated land in Argentina (USDA, 2013). How-
ever, rather than being predicated on the entry of a new governing
elite, it has generated a shift in economic elites. As its leftwing gov-
ernment has drawn its main leaders from the ranks of the Peronist
party, it can hardly be considered a new political elite in Argentina.
However, soy production has generated shifts in the power relations
among agricultural producer groups. Although not completely displac-
ing the traditional landowning elite, new groups related to agribusiness
have gained signiﬁcant inﬂuence in the governance of agricultural pro-
duction. This group is composed of agricultural producers, utilizing a
management model in which several individuals or companies have
different roles in the system, from renting land from landowners to
administering external investments and managing the total production
(Benchimol, 2008). They run what is commonly called “agroenter-
prises”, in which landowners, contractors and investment brokers are
involved. Such agribusinesses agreements can take the form of invest-
ment funds, agroassociations (pools de siembra), ﬁnancial trust coalitions
and simple contract alliances, among others. The most recent attempt
to quantify it argued that agroenterprises are responsible for about 70%
of total grain production in Argentina (Barri and Wahren, 2010). Today
the ﬁgure is probably higher.
At the same time as the soy expansion generated a new agricul-
tural (but not necessarily rural) elite, the strained relations between
the four governments of the Kirchners (two of Néstor Kirchner and
two of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) and the traditional agricultur-
alists contributed to the speed of the soy expansion. The main reason
behind the conﬂicts was the increase in export taxes on agricultural
products, particularly during the ﬁrst government of Cristina Fernández
de Kirchner. However, conﬂicts also arose due to the perceived lack of
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governmental support for and interest in agriculture in general, due
to lack of both predictability in “framework conditions” (including
adjustments in export taxes) and technical support. This contributed
to a weakening of the inﬂuence of the old rural elite (Zenteno Hopp,
Hanche-Olsen and Sejenovich, 2015). Moreover, in a context character-
ized by high levels of uncertainty for many farmers, many of them either
leased the land to agrientreprises for soy production or turned to soy
production since its proﬁtability was considered almost guaranteed over
time (Calvo et al., 2011). While depending on transnational companies,
ﬁrst and foremost Monsanto for seed and fertilizer, there has also been
a prolonged conﬂict between Argentinean farmers and the agricultural
giant. Argentinean farmers ﬁrst objected to paying royalties for the fertil-
izer Roundup Ready as Monsanto had failed to obtain a valid patent for
it in Argentina, and later farmers opposed the payment of new royalties
for the new soy seed BTRR2.
Initially it was also argued that GM soy would result in less environ-
mental impact than conventional soy. It was argued that soy production
would minimize soil cover loss due to the no-till method, and that
the use of the herbicide glyphosate would prevent the use of other,
and more toxic, agrochemicals applied in conventional production
(Bindraban et al., 2009). GM soy soon acquired a privileged posi-
tion among the nation’s exports and also became a main source of
governmental income. Currently the production of GM soy generates
approximately one-tenth of the GDP and one-quarter of the nation’s
export value (Loman, 2013). The conversion to the GM soy model gen-
erated a net value of US$65,435 million for Argentina between 1996
and 2010, due to savings in costs and higher proﬁtability (Trigo, 2011).
This source of funding has been of key importance for the govern-
ment’s ambitious programmes of social redistribution. Added to this, the
economic interest by national and international agribusiness compa-
nies explains the government’s unwillingness to impose more ambitious
environmental guidelines on GM soy production. Only very recently
has there been a broader public debate due to increasing opposition
against and conﬂicts related to soy production, exposing the severe soil
degradation resulting from soy production and glyphosate’s negative
impact on human health, among other issues (Skill and Grinberg, 2013).
The role of knowledge and the contours of
elite reorientation
However, we also see the contours of a third process: “elite reorienta-
tion”, or, in other words, the shift in the dominating ideas of an elite.
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Both Schumpeter and Weber emphasized the orientation and capacity
of elites as a major factor in understanding the role of the state in devel-
opment, rejecting that this could be directly inferred from their position
in the capitalist economy (as the Marxists would argue). In recent Latin
American history we have two major examples of such elite reorienta-
tion: the process of democratization of the 1980s and 1990s, and the
neoliberal transformation in the same period. Neither processes of elite
reorientation happened out of the blue. Rather, the new ideas achieved
inﬂuence due to a crisis and exhaustion of prior models and a gradual
shift in interests. Currently the seriousness of the environmental cri-
sis, and the climate crisis more speciﬁcally, could open up space for new
ideas brought about by new elite groups, the reorientation of old groups,
or a new dynamic interplay between different elite groups.
Despite the numerous contradictions evident in the environmental
policies pursued by Brazil’s three leftwing governments (two under Luis
Inácio Lula da Silva and one under Dilma Rousseff), in the Amazonian
states of Acre and Amazonas a shift in elites and in the environmental
policies pursued in these states occurred at the state level. Despite the
differences (in size among other things), around 2009/2010, Acre and
Amazonas were the least deforested states in Brazil, with small Acre hav-
ing lost 14% of its original forest and Amazonas only 3% (Lemos and
Silva, 2011). Our research found that this was closely related to a shift
in elites occurring in different ways. The turning point in Acre was the
coming to power of the PT candidate in 1998, whereas in Amazonas
it occurred as a candidate linked to the old elites shifted towards a
more environmentalist and less developmentalist strategy to distance
himself from the old ruling elite in order to gain votes in the local
elections of 1992 (Toni, Villarroel and Taitson Bueno, 2015). Thus the
process at the local level has been very different from that at the federal
level. At the federal government level an “elite settlement” between eco-
nomic elites and rightwing parties, on the one hand, and elites of the
leftwing parties, on the other hand, has led to the favouring of devel-
opmental goals over the environment (Arretche, 2013). In contrast, at
the state level there has been some room for elite shifts through elite
reorientation. The autonomy given to lower politicoadministrative lev-
els in the federal model has thus been crucially important for the latter
process.
Global initiatives, such as REDD, are also fostering a possible “elite
reorientation” through the emergence of a new knowledge-based elite
that is organized in wide and often transnational networks. These net-
works have been able to inﬂuence the attitudes and strategies of certain
elites, although this has not implied a complete reorientation of old
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elites (i.e. those linked to agroexport activities) or of government elites,
particularly because of the centrality of resource extraction in economic
growth in the region (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015). The global REDD
initiative was launched at the climate negotiations in 2005 but only
gained political traction in 2007, when donor governments agreed to
commit substantial economic resources to establish a fund that would
pay developing countries not to deforest. The principle of REDD is
relatively simple: it is based on the idea that it is possible to pay coun-
tries and communities for not cutting down their forests. However, the
implementation of REDD is not so simple. Latin America is endowed
with vast amounts of forested land but as a whole the region has
the world’s highest rate of deforestation (Hall, 2012). Because of that,
much attention and efforts have been invested in trying to success-
fully develop REDD projects in the region. These projects are, to date,
only demonstration activities that will allow implementers to under-
stand how REDD would work on the ground. That means understanding
how payments are to be implemented and to whom, how to monitor
that the area covered by forest is effectively not deforested, and how to
ensure that economic beneﬁts are distributed in a fair manner among
those that contribute to forest conservation and constitute a legitimate
beneﬁciary of REDD. Since forests are valuable for a range of different
actors, from forest-dwellers to drug cartels, control of forested land is
a contested issue and thus establishing national or local REDD projects
is a complex task. In addition, many valuable non-renewable resources,
such as minerals and oil, are often located in forested areas and sev-
eral governments in Latin America have declared extractive activities
as being key to national economic development. REDD has attracted
the attention of various and disparate actors, including environmen-
tal NGOs, research centres, extractive industry companies, indigenous
peoples’ organizations and international development agencies.
REDD is a broad and vague enough idea to allow different interpre-
tations of it that can ﬁt the goals of different actors (Angelsen and
McNeil, 2012). This has allowed these actors to distinctly deﬁne the
actions necessary to implement REDD at local levels. In the process,
certain narratives, values and visions gain prominence and those pro-
moting such ideas gain power to deﬁne how REDD should look in
speciﬁc contexts. Controlling the production of knowledge seems to
be a prominent strategy of different actors to position themselves in
the REDD debate, particularly in the countries in the Amazon basin
(Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015). The knowledge required to partici-
pate in the REDD debates is not just any type of knowledge. It has to
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be maintained and strengthened through particular networks, in which
different concepts and arguments are socially constructed and legiti-
mated through complex processes that have produced new dominant
forms of expertise and consultancy (Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Bumpus
and Liverman, 2011). These networks that are coalitions of actors who
share values, interests and practices can be conceptualized as elites inso-
far as they control key resources: the production and promotion of
speciﬁc knowledge or forms to generate knowledge and access to policy-
making forums. Ideas, values and resources circulate within networks,
and as such the networks may set the limits or boundaries of how
reality is to be understood or to set apart what constitutes expert and
non-expert knowledge. A range of different private actors and compa-
nies support REDD activities, forming alliances and promoting certain
models, particularly those that are positive to carbon markets. In this
way, REDD is offering a new regime of proﬁt-making possibilities in
the trade of carbon offsets, but also in fostering the development of
new forms of consultancy and expertise. REDD science-policy networks
are inﬂuencing, although not necessarily reorienting, the position of
other elite actors. For example, various transnational and national com-
panies, such as mining and energy-producing companies, plantation
companies, forestry companies and carbon-market companies, engage
in REDD demonstration activities by funding speciﬁc projects. Since
dominant REDD science-policy networks have ideological positions that
do not conﬂict with the ideological position of corporations, it has
been possible to establish alliances between them. But since resource
extraction continues to be central to the economies of most Amazon
countries (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012), often at the expense of
forests, the degree to which REDD elites can inﬂuence other elites is
limited. Mining, gas and oil extraction are the most important activ-
ities to generate economic revenues for most of the countries in the
Amazon basin. The development of infrastructure such as hydropower
and road-building are also priorities for these countries. All these activi-
ties are, in most cases, planned to occur in forest areas. In addition, the
agricultural frontier is expanding in many Latin American countries.
Therefore we cannot afﬁrm that REDD elites have a strong inﬂuence in
the Amazon countries’ broader development policy-making or in the
national visions of development, but REDD elites have indeed been suc-
cessful in engaging actors from the agricultural and industrial sectors in
the funding of demonstration activities.
Taken together, the cases of Brazil and of REDD show that a shift
in elites sometimes leads to more ambitious environmental goals and
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regulations. Whether or not this happens depends on the degree to
which new elites are able to inﬂuence the positions and views of old
elites. Chapter 6 suggests that the views, aspirations and environmen-
tal orientation of elites are not homogeneous. It is conceivable that
we will see the ascendance of elites in the future with aspirations of
a more sustainable development policy and environmental governance.
It is also necessary to remember that centre-left governments in Latin
America won the elections thanks to the support of wide segments of
the population, particularly the marginalized and subaltern ones. These
governments depended on various types of alliance between different
grassroots organizations and social movements. If these movements and
grassroots organizations are able to exert some pressure on their govern-
ments to address environmental concerns in the future, we may see a
shift towards more equitable and sustainable models of environmental
governance. If popular mobilization continues to be crucial for main-
taining leftist governments in power, at some point the environmental
concerns of the population need to be addressed.
Conclusion
Back in 1977, Marxist scholar Fred Block rejected the possibility that a
leftwing government in power could make a signiﬁcant change to the
productive structure of a country, as any government presiding over a
capitalist economy inevitably has to care about the creation of employ-
ment and economic growth, and therefore would never counter the
interests of the capitalists. Over the last decade we have seen a mul-
titude of strategies applied by leftwing Latin American governments
to overcome the constraints presented by old elites that are often also
political adversaries. Although, judging from media reports, the relation-
ship between the centre-left government and the old economic elites
is strained, under the surface they are more often than not character-
ized by accommodation and consent than outright conﬂict. However,
in the process there has been a gradual elite shift where groups that have
beneﬁted from the centre-left governments policies gradually gain inﬂu-
ence at the expense of old rural and business elites. This has occurred in
Argentina with the strengthening of agrienterprises; in Bolivia with the
emerging soy elite; in Ecuador with the new cadres of technocrats in the
ministries; and in a more incipient form in El Salvador with new elites
related to ALBA investments.3
In addition to new governmental policies, we have found two fac-
tors to be of key importance to the emergence of new elites: knowledge
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and technology. Controlling capital or politics without also controlling
knowledge and technology has shown to be insufﬁcient to dominate the
development agenda and the environmental governance of it. Knowl-
edge and technology can be “bought” by those who control capital,
but this is only partly true because it is necessary to have the sufﬁ-
cient knowledge, relevant technology and appropriate attitude towards
innovation to know where to invest in it. Also, obtaining and making
use of these resources are long-term processes. The corollary to that is
that groups that control knowledge and technology may also inﬂuence
environmental governance to an extent disproportionate to their polit-
ical position or economic resources, as we have seen in the cases of the
REDD networks, and in a different way in the Ecuadorean Ministry of
Agriculture.
This may have positive and negative implications for the environ-
ment. The control of knowledge can be an obstacle to better environ-
mental governance, such as when it is used by a technocracy to pursue
an agenda that pays little attention to environmental or distributional
concerns, or when it is controlled by a transnational company as a
means to strengthen its own proﬁt generation. However, it can also be
used to inﬂuence the agenda in a more sustainable way, such as has
been observed in the case of, for example, El Salvador, where groups of
environmentalists with high levels of technical education were included
in the government. In spite of not having achieved the inﬂuence that
they had hoped for, they did inﬂuence parts of the governmental agenda
to become more directed towards adapting to climate change and avoid-
ing new environmental catastrophes induced by intensive export agri-
culture. The emergence of what could be called a “new, environmental
technocratic elite” was also observed in other countries, including Chile
and Bolivia (Reyes, 2012; Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015). This new
technocratic elite differs from other historical groups of technocrats,
not only by being uniﬁed by a different body of knowledge from,
for example, the neoliberal economists that constitute the technocrats
supporting the neo-liberal conversion. They also show a different atti-
tude towards relating to non-elite groups. Many have been involved
in environmental movements at local, national and transnational lev-
els, and many stay in touch with communities through everything
from frequent visits to membership of Facebook groups. Although their
actual inﬂuence varies, their strengthening may lead to stronger envi-
ronmental governance over time. Moreover, where the government
favours party cadres over technically competent ofﬁcials in impor-
tant positions, the likelihood that such “new technocracies” emerge
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diminishes as, for example, in the case of Argentina (Hanche-Olsen,
2013).
Yet it is impossible to ignore at least three “constants” in environmen-
tal governance in Latin America. One is the importance of global mar-
kets. During the last decade, Latin America as a region has made signiﬁ-
cant progress in a number of social indicators, but it has also reinforced
its dependency on natural resource export, and therefore its vulnerabil-
ity to changes in the global markets for a limited set of export goods.
This is less so in Mexico and Central America than in South America,
but across the region there is little in the way of a “structural transfor-
mation” towards a production structure dependant more on knowledge
and innovation and less on cheap labour and natural resources. As noted
by CEPAL (2014), without such a conversion, it will be difﬁcult to sus-
tain incipient processes towards a more just resource distribution, or to
counteract the serious processes of environmental degradation.
The second “constant” is limitation in resources. For leftist govern-
ments with little support from, and often in conﬂict with, the economic
elite, to stay in power and to implement ambitious programmes for soci-
etal transformation has required both to employ policies to strengthen
the state and to confront the opposition from old elites. State-building
has been an unavoidable priority for the centre-left governments in
Latin America to be able to deliver strong programmes of resource
redistribution to address historical inequalities, and in this way to lift
millions out of poverty. Several strategies have been employed to face
opposition from old elites: grooming new elites, confronting compet-
ing elites or allying with outside elites. Given that the international
context has been very favourable for resource extraction, focusing on
these sectors (particularly mining and agriculture) has allowed centre-
left governments to increase their revenues and deliver their promises of
resource redistribution. At the same time, larger revenues have permit-
ted governments in Latin America to transform their relationships with
traditional international elites (weakening their inﬂuence in domestic
politics) and to enter into relationships with new international elites.
In this context it can be said that leftist governments in Latin America
have taken a pragmatic approach to be able to secure their position; this
approach implies that, in development policy, economic revenues take
precedence over environmental concerns. We can then afﬁrm that the
effects of the elite shift on environmental governance in Latin America
have been limited thus far.
The third “constant” is the abyss between the traditional elite and
non-elite groups in terms of the meaning given to nature and what
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constitutes a just governance of it, in terms of both processes and out-
come. Although, as we have shown, the elites go through processes
of change that lead to episodes of “elite circulation” as well as “elite
conversion”, we still ﬁnd elite groups across the region with a very lim-
ited understanding of the local environmental impact of developmental
projects, the importance and meaning of resources such as land and
water to rural communities, and what it takes to actually reach under-
standings across cultural and class divides. Without this, reaching more
sustainable and just environmental governance in Latin America may
still be far away.
Notes
1. This approach focused on the conditions for – and evolution of – a state with
a monopoly on legitimate violence, and an institutional bureaucracy capable
of implementing policies and controlling the masses (e.g. Migdal et al., 1994;
Evans, 1995). Such a state, in which a given set of institutions’ right to tax
and demand loyalty in return for protection and the extension of beneﬁt are
no longer questioned, is, for example, considered to be a precondition for the
high-growth policies and business–state relationship of the East Asian devel-
opmental states (Amsden, 2001) as well as the more historical examples of
development, such as that of Europe (Tilly, 1992).
2. He argued rather that “Between socialism as we deﬁned it and democracy as
we deﬁned it there is no necessary relation” (Schumpeter, 1976: 284).
3. The tendency observed in El Salvador would probably have been more
pronounced had we included Nicaragua and Venezuela in the study.
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